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Abstract
After many terrorists are captured and receive prison sentences, Indonesia instituted a deradicalization 
program for terrorist prisoners. This article presents a review of the literature on Indonesia’s de­
radicalization program for terrorist prisoners. Author concludes that First, there are some limitations 
among the agencies in achieving the goal of rehabilitation. Second, there is no agreement as to whether 
Indonesia’s program reflects disengagement or de-radicalization. Third, the program is currently developed 
and managed locally by prison directors consistent with a prison’s circumstances and capability. Fourth, 
Indonesia has no measurement criteria for indicating the effectiveness of the program. Fifth, less attention 
has been paid to Indonesian prison officers who are implementing the program.
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Intisari
Setelah banyak teroris ditangkap dan menjalani pidana penjara, Indonesia mulai menjalankan program 
deradikalisasi terhadap narapidana teroris. Artikel ini bertujuan menyajikan sebuah kajian pustaka tentang 
program deradikalisasi Indonesia terhadap narapidana teroris. Kesimpulan dari artikel ini adalah Pertama, 
terdapat kelemahan kelembagaan terkait deradikalisasi narapidana teroris; Kedua, belum jelas apakah 
kebijakan penanganan terorisme mencerminkan pembebasan atau deradikalisasi narapidana teroris; 
Ketiga, program deradikalisasi dikelola secara lokal oleh kepala lembaga pemasyarakatan (Kalapas) 
sejalan dengan keadaan dan kemampuan lembaga pemasyarakatan (Lapas); Keempat, tidak ada ukuran 
pasti untuk mengukur efektivitas deradikalisasi; dan Kelima, minim perhatian pada lapas terkait program 
deradikalisasi.
Kata Kunci: terorisme, narapidana teroris, deradikalisasi.
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A. Introduction
Terrorist attacks indicate a significant threat 
to global security. The attacks occur in many 
countries, including Indonesia. Ongoing acts of 
terrorism in Indonesia are an indication that the 
country is vulnerable to this serious crime. Incidents 
have occurred in Aceh, Bali, Maluku, Sulawesi, and 
Sumatra. The first Bali bombing on the 12th October 
2002 marked a pivotal moment for the development 
of a criminal justice initiative in Indonesia. It led 
to the Indonesian National Police implementing a 
range of measures to improve detection, prevention, 
and enforcement against terrorism.1 
As a result of these initiatives there are 
increased numbers of convicted terrorists in 
Indonesian prisons. According to the Indonesian 
National Police discussion paper entitled ‘Law 
Enforcement in Indonesia’ (2011) there were 
695 terrorist suspects arrested and 519 convicted 
and imprisoned between 2002 and 2011.2 Of 
considerable concern is the reported number of 
terrorist recidivists. Petrus Reinhard Golose argued 
that many of the convicted terrorists repeated acts 
of terrorism, and were involved in radicalizing other 
inmates while imprisoned.3
However, it remains unclear how and why 
this recidivism and radicalization happens in 
Indonesian prisons. For example, it is not known 
whether former prisoners who commit terrorism 
acts after release were radicalized in prison, or 
were acting on established beliefs. Furthermore, it 
is unclear what supervisory prison models are in 
place to prevent repeat offending. Such questions 
raise numerous policy and practical issues for 
the Indonesian authorities, namely: the specific 
programs and personal development models that are 
implemented in prison; the ideology or theory that 
informs the best practice of these models; and how 
the Indonesian Prison Authority (IPA) evaluates or 
assesses the success of a model.
Even though a deradicalization program 
has been launched by the Indonesian government, 
questions and criticisms are still raised. The 
International Crisis Group (ICG), for example, 
recommended that the Indonesian Government 
accelerate efforts to put in place a system under 
the Corrections Directorate for identifying and 
monitoring high-risk detainees, both while in 
detention as well as after their release.4 Furthermore, 
ICG recommended improving supervision through 
upgrading the analytical capacity of correction 
staff.5
When convicted terrorists Taufik bin Abdul 
Halim (hereafter Dani) and Edi Setiono (hereafter 
Abas) were sent to prison, their incarceration 
marked the first time that an Indonesian prison 
attempted the rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners. 
Dani and Abas had been found guilty by the Central 
Jakarta District Court as the perpetrators of the 
Plaza Atrium bombing in August 2001.6 They were 
jailed in Cipinang prison, Jakarta, and lived in the 
same cell and block with other ‘ordinary’ prisoners. 
After the incident of the first Bali Bombing 
in 2002, Indonesia subsequently introduced Anti-
Terrorism Law (ATL).Due to the fact that many terror 
attacks occurred after the ATL was introduced, the 
number of terrorist inmates has increased sharply. 
Many criminals who commit terror attacks have 
since been convicted as terrorists. Taufik Andrie 
accurately argues that this was a period when 
1 Galih Priatmodjo, 2010, Densus 88: The Uncover Squad, Narasi, Yogyakarta, p.5.
2 Mabes Polri, “Reformasi dan Optimalisasi Penegakan Hukum di Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia”, Paper, FGD Penegakan Hukum di 
Indonesia, Jakarta, 12 October 2011.
3 As stated in the seminar “From Radicalization to Terrorism” which held by Setara Institute in Jakarta, 25 January 2012. See: Berita Satu, 
“Petinggi BNPT: Deradikalisasi Belum Sukses”, http://www.beritasatu.com/politik/27961-petinggi-bnpt-deradikalisasi-belum-sukses.html, 
accessed on 10 February 2014.
4 International Crisis Group, “How Indonesian Extremists Regroup”, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south­east­asia/indonesia/how­
indonesian­extremists­regroup, accessed on 15 November 2014. 
5 Ibid.
6 Tempo, “Terror Bom di Indonesia (Beberapa di Luar Negeri) dari Waktu ke Waktu”, http://tempo.co.id/hg/timeline/2004/04/17/tml,20040417-
01,id.html, accessed on 15 November 2014. 
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Indonesian prisons faced difficulties in dealing with 
terrorist prisoners.7 To make it worse, it was found 
that a terrorist prisoner became ‘passive’ actors for 
the next terror acts while behind bars. For example, 
Imam Samudra, a terrorist convicted after the first 
Bali bombing, had been found to be a ‘passive’ 
actor in the second Bali bombing. Communication 
between Noordin M. Top—the intellectual leader 
behind the attacks—occurred when Imam Samudra 
was imprisoned in Kerobokan prison. These issues 
faced by Indonesian prisons require investigation.
This article explores the issue of Indonesia’s 
deradicalization approach for terrorist prisoners by 
reviewing relevant literature on this issue. The gap 
is identified in order to propose a new approach for 
future research. In line with these objectives, this 
article investigates three issues: (1) the trends of the 
crime of terrorism in Indonesia; (2) the facts and 
figures of terrorist prisoners in Indonesian prisons; 
and (3) the gaps in the literature on Indonesia’s 
prison-based deradicalization program. Two major 
terms related to this article, deradicalization and 
terrorist prisoners, should be clarified. First, de­
radicalization is defined as “any initiative that 
tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-offending 
through addressing the specific and relevant 
disengagement issues”.8 Second, terrorist prisoners 
refers to those who are convicted by the Court for 
terrorism acts under their country’s anti-terrorism 
laws, and as a consequence live in prisons or jails, 
regardless of the length of their imprisonment.9 In 
this sense, the term will not include: those who are 
categorized as ‘suspected terrorists’; those who are 
being interrogated by the police; those awaiting trial 
or in trial sessions; or those who have the status of 
fugitives from acts of terrorism. 
B. Discussion
1. Terrorism in Indonesia: Incidents, 
Networks, and Future Threats
 Bomb attacks in Indonesia began in 2000 
with the targeting of churches, followed by several 
suicide bombings until 2005. Based on the number 
of victims and international impact, the most 
notorious attacks were: the first Bali bombing in 
2002; the first Marriot Hotel bombing in Jakarta in 
2003; the bombing of the Australian Embassy in 
2004; and the second Bali bombing in 2005.10 As 
a result of subsequent investigations, in November 
2005 the Indonesian National Police (INP) killed 
one of the most important masterminds behind 
these bombing attacks—Dr. Azahari Husin.11 
Between 2005 and 2009 bomb attacks were 
controlled successfully by the INP, and Indonesia 
experienced no bombing incidents during this 
period.12 The effectiveness of the INP in preventing 
attacks from 2005-2009 was the result of improved 
investigation with a focus on prevention. Hence, the 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) cells could be dismantled, and 
some future attacks were prevented. Interestingly, 
the investigation’s processes were also supported 
by Nasir bin Abas, “the former head of JI’s Mantiqi 
III and head of military training in the Southern 
Philippines who became disillusioned with the 
al-Qaeda campaign of terror against soft Western 
targets”.13 His role remains vital because he provides 
valuable information for police investigations of JI 
and its operations. 
However, in 2009 bombs exploded at the 
J.W. Marriott Hotel and the Ritz Carlton Hotel in 
7 Taufik Andrie, “Kehidupan di Balik Jeruji: Terorisme dan Kehidupan Penjara di Indonesia”, Institute for International Peace Building Position 
Paper, Vol. 2, November, 2011, p. 6.
8 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs”, 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2010, p. 280.
9 See: Article 1 point (32) of the Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana – KUHAP) and Article 1 point 
(7) of the the Indonesian Law No. 12 of 1995 on Correctional Institution. 
10 Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono (Hereinafter referred to as Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono I), 2012, Terorisme di Indonesia: Dalam Tinjauan Psikologi, 
Pustaka Alvabet, Jakarta, p. 75. 
11 Galih Priatmodjo, Op. cit, p. 94.
12 Ibid., p. 76.
13 Zachary Abuza, “The Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in South East Asia: A Preliminary Assessment” in Tore Bjørgo and John 
Horgan, 2009, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, Routledge, Oxon, p. 198.
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Jakarta. The bombing at the J.W. Marriott Hotel 
was the second at that location, following an earlier 
attack in 2004. Several perpetrators were identified, 
including Indonesia’s most wanted Islamist militant, 
Noordin M. Top. The authorities claimed that he 
was the mastermind behind the attack.14 Noordin 
was a fugitive after several bombing attacks, until 
he was killed in a shoot-out by the INP during a raid 
in Central Java in September 2009. Even though 
Noordin and Dr. Azahari Husin had been killed, 
Indonesia did not become secure from the threat of 
terrorism. Sydney Jones stated that:
It’s a major success for the police but it doesn’t 
mean, unfortunately, that the problem of 
terrorism is over. It’s still unclear how many 
people were in Noordin’s group and there 
are a number of fugitives still at large who 
have at least the potential to replace him as 
the leader of an al Qaeda-like organization.15 
Indeed, attacks have still occurred since 
2009, but with a shift in both the methods and the 
targets. The perpetrators not only used bombs as a 
strategy to attack the targets, but also used firearms. 
Moreover, the attackers were not only focused on 
Western targets, but also on local ones. Heiduk 
noted that “Indonesian officials and government 
institutions have increasingly become targets”.16 A 
failed bomb plot to assassinate former President, 
Yudhoyono, in 2010 is an example of this change in 
strategy. The plot failed when it was uncovered by 
police surveillance and two bomb makers were killed 
during the subsequent raid. As another example, 
Hamparan Perak police station in Sumatera Utara 
province was attacked and destroyed by several 
people with firearms in 2010, killing three police 
officers.17 Since this incident, several other police 
stations have been attacked by terrorists and more 
police officers shot and killed. In March, June, and 
August 2014, for instance, former Indonesian Police 
Chief, General Sutarman, declared that three police 
officers who died in Bima were shot by terrorists.18 
Rather than attacking Western targets, 
therefore, evidence suggests that one of the main 
trends of terrorism in Indonesia since 2009 has 
been attacking the police (either by shooting police 
officers or destroying police stations). Another 
important trend to emerge during this period has 
been attacks on the public, regardless of whether 
they are Muslim or not. In April 2011, for example, 
there was a bomb attack on a mosque in the Cirebon 
police station complex, as well as an attack on the 
Christ Cathedral Church that was prevented by 
police. Later, in August 2013, the Vihara Ekayana 
Buddhist Centre in Jakarta was also the target of 
bombing attacks.19 
To summarize, since 2009 the terrorists’ have 
changed from attacking mostly Western targets to 
attacking specific targets such as police stations, 
churches, viharas, or even mosques. The finding of 
a list of viharas located in and around Jakarta which 
was printed by suspected terrorists (who were 
arrested in Jakarta and East Java in January 2014) 
indicates that targets are random. Taqwadin believes 
that this trend has been influenced by the change of 
al Qaeda’s tactics since Ayman Al Zawahiri became 
the group’s leader.20 
The majority of people assume that JI is 
behind the bomb attacks in Indonesia, particularly 
the incidents from 2000 to 2005. During this 
14 BBC, “Fugitive Linked to Jakarta Blasts”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8157104.stm, accessed on 12 October 2014.
15 Reuters, “Q+A: Noordin Mohammad Top and Islamic Militancy in Indonesia”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/17/us-indonesia-
militants-qanda-sb-idUSTRE58G2OR20090917, accessed on 12 October 2014. 
16 Felix Heiduk, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, 2012, p. 33. 
17 Ari Anggada, “Penyerang Polsek Hamparan Perak Tak Beradab”, http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/179449-penyerang-polsek-
hamparan­perak­tak­beradab, accessed on 12 October 2014.
18 Merdeka, “Kapolri Sebut Penembak Polisi di Bima Teroris”, http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/kapolri-sebut-penembak-polisi-di-bima-
teroris.html, accessed on 12 October 2014.
19 Kompas, “Kabareskrim: Ledakan di Vihara Ekayana Perbuatan Teroris”, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/08/05/0030095/Kabareskrim.
Ledakan.di.Vihara.Ekayana.Perbuatan.Teroris, accessed on 13 October 2014. 
20 Daniel Akbar Taqwadin, “Trend Baru Terorisme di Indonesia”, http://www.academia.edu/5838920/Trend_Baru_Terorisme_di_Indonesia, 
accessed on 12 October 2014.
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period the perpetrators came from JI, which was 
established in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu 
Bakar Bassyir, as stated by Sarlito Wirawan.21 This 
group has a relationship with al Qaeda, indicated 
by the programs of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu 
Bakar Bassyir sending the Bali bombers group to 
‘pre-jihad training’ on the border of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, and to jihad fronts in Afghanistan, the 
Philippines, Ambon, and Poso.22 JI also has close 
links to other Islamist Militant groups throughout 
South East Asia, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) in the Philippines.23 Importantly, JI’s main 
goal is to establish a pan-Islamic country in South 
East Asia.24
In relation to the types of terrorist target, 
it could be argued that terrorism in Indonesia is 
religiously motivated due to the fact that JI pursue 
the replacement of the established government with 
an Islamic government. Furthermore, JI is striving 
for the creation of a pan-Islamic government in 
Indonesia despite the opposition of the majority of 
Indonesian Muslims to this idea. 
Types of terrorism vary across the emerging 
literature in the fields of sociology, criminology, 
and peace studies. Gus Martin, for instance, 
divides terrorism into five categories, namely: state 
terrorism; dissident terrorism; criminal terrorism; 
international terrorism; and religious terrorism.25 
State terrorism (terrorism ‘from above’) is terrorism 
committed by established governments against 
their perceived enemies, either internationally or 
nationally, while dissident terrorism (terrorism ‘from 
below’) is terrorism committed by various non-
governmental actors against governments, specific 
groups, or other perceived enemies.26 Criminal 
terrorism is terrorism in which the goal is financial 
or political gain, or both; whereas international 
terrorism is terrorism in which the goal is a global 
effect, or the target is an international symbol.27 
Religious terrorism is “terrorism motivated by an 
absolute belief that an otherworldly power has 
sanctioned – and commanded – the application of 
terrorist violence for the greater glory of faith”.28 
On the other hand, critical scholars state that 
categorizing terrorism can be more of an obstacle 
than an aid to rigorous research. However, they 
also argue that attempts to categorize terrorism 
can be beneficial in gaining understanding of this 
phenomenon.29 Therefore, categorizing the acts 
of terrorism in Indonesia into a specific typology 
is important for a better understanding of the 
problems. Based on the current situation, as well 
as the body of literature and empirical research, the 
acts of terrorism in Indonesia can be categorized as 
‘religious terrorism’ according to the definition stated 
previously. For instance, Martin identified Laskar 
Jihad, the armed Islamic group in Indonesia, as a 
religious terrorist group along with Aum Shinrikyo, 
Lord’s Resistance Army, Palestine Islamic Jihad, 
Hamas, Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, Jammu-Kashmir 
groups, Sikh groups, and Algerian/North African 
cells.30 
According to Heather S. Gregg, religious 
terrorism can be divided into three subcategories 
based on their goals: “fomenting the apocalypse, 
creating a religious government, and religiously 
cleansing a state”.31 Because the goal is to establish 
an Islamic government in Indonesia, JI’s intention 
21 Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono I, Op. cit., p. 78.
22 Dwi Hendro Sunarko, 2006, Ideologi Teroris Indonesia, Pensil-324, Jakarta, p. 127.
23 Clarke R. Jones and Resurrecion S. Morales, “Integration versus Segregation: A Preliminary Examination of Philippine Correctional Facilities 
for De-Radicalization”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 35, No. 3, 2012, p. 213; See also: V. Arianti, “Implications of Umar Patek’s 
Conviction”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 8, 2012, p. 9.
24 Aryono D. Pusponegoro, “Terrorism in Indonesia”, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2003, p. 103. See also Richard Jackson, 
et al., 2011, Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, p. 161; Clarke R. Jones and Resurrecion S. Morales, Op. cit., 
p. 214.
25 Gus Martin, 2010, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues, Sage Publications, Los Angeles, p. 46. 
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Richard Jackson, et al., Op. cit., p. 171.
30 Gus Martin, 2014, Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, p. 156.
31 Heather S. Gregg, “Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism”, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2014, p. 40.
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identifies them as an example of the second 
subcategory. 
On the other hand, Bilveer Singh has 
warned that blaming incidents only on JI is not 
accurate because “there are many regionally-
based terrorists groups that have nothing to do 
with the JI”.32 Related to this statement, a report by 
Ansyaad Mbai, the former Head of the Indonesian 
National Anti-Terrorism Agency (BNPT - Badan 
Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme), offers 
support for Singh’s view. Furthermore, Ansyaad 
Mbai stated that there are various concentrations 
of terrorist groups in Indonesia, including: Qoidah 
Aminah in North Sumatera and Aceh; Mujahid 
Indonesia Barat in Lampung and Java; Islamic 
State for Indonesia (NII) in South Kalimantan and 
Tasikmalaya; Mujahid Indonesia Timur in Poso; 
Asmar in Sulawesi; Walid group in Ambon; Jamaah 
Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) in Bali; Bima networks in 
West Nusa Tenggara; and Solo networking group.33 
These groups demonstrate the widespread nature of 
new terrorist cells and their networks in Indonesia, 
whether they have links to JI or not. 
This situation indicates Indonesia remains 
under threat of terrorism in the future. Even though 
in a study has concluded that “Indonesia is the least 
risky, least volatile, and most resilient”34 when 
compared with the Philippines and Thailand, many 
experts (Sarlito Wirawan;35 Carl Ungerer;36 ICG37) 
predict that terrorist attacks will likely occur in 
Indonesia in the future. It does mean that terrorist 
attacks may still occur in Indonesia in the future, 
even if there is greater risk elsewhere in the region.
2. Terrorist Prisoners in Indonesia: Facts 
and Figures
Data concerning the exact number of 
convicted terrorists in Indonesian prisons vary 
between reports or articles. In some articles 
(Abuza;38 Horgan and Braddock39) it is estimated 
that more than 300 individuals were sent to prison 
by 2007, while Ungerer estimates that around two-
thirds of nearly 600 suspects were convicted between 
2000 and 2010.40 Similarly, the IRIN, a newspaper 
published in Nairobi, reported that 600 out of 830 
were sentenced for conducting acts of terrorism 
in the decade 2002 - 2012.41 Notwithstanding the 
different timeframes, the inconsistent data reported 
in these sources is confusing. 
On the official website of the Directorate 
General of Corrections, the number of terrorist 
convicts is presented only after 2011. The number 
of terrorist prisoners in the years 2011 to 2015 is 
10942, 20443, 27644, 27745, and 21646 respectively. 
The data show that by August 2013 the number of 
terrorism prisoners had increased to nearly three 
times the number in August 2011, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.1 below.
32 Bilveer Singh, “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2004, 
p. 65.
33 Tempo, “Peta Konsentrasi Jaringan Teroris di Indonesia”, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/08/10/078598475/Peta-Konsentrasi-
Jaringan­Teroris­di­Indonesia, accessed on 13 October 2014.
34 Gentry White, Michael D. Porter, Lorraine Mazerolle, “Terrorism Risk, Resilience, and Volatility: A Comparison of Terrorism Patterns in 
Three Southeast Asian Countries”, Journal Quantitative Criminology, Vol. 29, 2013, p. 315.
35 Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono I, Op. cit., p. 84.
36 Carl Ungerer, “Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian Prison Experience”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute – Special Report, 
Issue 40, May 2011, p. 17.
37 International Crisis Group, “How Indonesian Extremists Regroup”, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south­east­asia/indonesia/how­
indonesian­extremists­regroup, accessed on 15 November 2014.
38 Zachary Abuza, Op. cit., p. 198. 
39 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, Op. cit., p. 274.
40 Carl Ungerer, Op. cit., p. 11.
41 IRIN, “Deradicalization – is Indonesia’s approach working?”, http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2012/10/15/%E2%80%9Cderadicalization%
E2%80%9D-indonesia%E2%80%99s-approach-working, accessed on 13 Oktober 2014.
42 Sistem Database Pemasyarakatan Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan RI, “Data Terakhir Jumlah Khusus Penghuni Perkanwil”, http://smslap.
ditjenpas.go.id/public/krl/current/monthly/year/2011/month/8, accessed on 23 June 2016.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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Graph 1. The Number of Terrorist Prisoners in 
Indonesia (2011 to 2015)
Source:  Sistem Database Pemasyarakatan Direk-
torat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan Republik 
Indonesia, 2016.
  
These prisoners are not isolated in one or two 
special prisons, but dispersed among several prisons 
across the provinces. By August 2015 the data show 
that 216 convicted terrorists were dispersed among 
33 prisons and detention centers throughout the 
islands (see Table 1).47 Pasir Putih Nusakambangan 
prison holds the largest concentration of terrorist 
inmates at 37 individuals, followed by Cipinang 
prison at 23 individuals. Additionally, the data 
indicate that there is only one female terrorist held 
in Indonesian jails. 
Table 1. The Distribution of Terrorist Prisoners 
in Indonesian Prisons and Detention Centers
No. Prison/Detention 
Center
Province Terrorist 
prisoners
1 Batu Nusakam-
bangan Prison
Central Java 19
2 Cipinang Prison Jakarta 23
3 Cirebon Prison West Java 11
4 Madiun Prison East Java 2
5 Medan Prison North Sumatera 1
6 Palembang Prison South Sumatera 1
7 Semarang Prison Central Java 18
8 Surabaya Prison East Java 12
9 Tangerang Prison Banten 13
10 Banda Aceh Prison Aceh 1
11 Besi Nusakam-
bangan Prison 
Central Java 4
12 Cibinong Prison West Java 19
47 Sistem Database Pemasyarakatan Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan RI, “Data Terakhir Jumlah Khusus Penghuni Per-UPT Pada Kanwil”, 
http://smslap.ditjenpas.go.id/public/krl/current/monthly/kanwil/all/year/2015/month/8/page/, accessed on 23 June 2016.
48 Ibid.
13 Karawang Prison West Java 4
14 Kediri Prison East Java 2
15 Kembang Kuning 
Nusakambangan 
Prison
Central Java 10
16 Magelang Prison Central Java 1
17 Palu Prison Central Sulawesi 2
18 Pamekasan Prison East Java 7
19 Pasir Putih Nusa-
kambangan Prison
Central Java 37
20 Permisan Nusa-
kambangan Prison
Central Java 10
21 Salemba Prison Jakarta 5
22 Kuningan Prison West Java 1
23 Subang Prison West Java 2
24 Garut Prison West Java 1
25 Ciamis Prison West Java 1
26 Cianjur Prison West Java 1
27 Indramayu Prison West Java 1
28 Lumajang Prison East Java 2
29 Cipinang Deten-
tion Center
Jakarta 2
30 Wonosobo Deten-
tion Center
Central Java 1
31 Jepara Detention 
Center
Central Java 9
32 Sanggan Detention 
Center
West Kalimantan 1
33 Tangerang Wom-
en’s Prison
Banten 1
Total 216
Source:  Sistem Database Pemasyarakatan Direk-
torat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan Republik 
Indonesia, 2016.
Compared to the number of all convicted 
prisoners under the charge of special criminal acts 
in Indonesian prisons, Table 1 indicates that the 
number of terrorism prisoners is small. Specifically, 
of 74,449 prisoners convicted of special criminal 
acts by August 2015, the number of terrorist 
prisoners was only 216.48 Thus, the percentage of 
prisoners convicted of terrorist offences is no more 
than one percent of the total number of prisoners 
held under special criminal acts.
These facts and figures for convicted 
terrorists are similar to the trends in other countries. 
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For example, the Netherlands had only five 
terrorism prisoners in 201049, while Australia held 
21 convicted terrorists in 2011,50 and Canada held 
18 convicted terrorists in 2015.51 Despite these 
relatively small totals, Andrew Silke argues that 
“when such prisoners do start to appear in the prison 
system their impact can be out of all proportion 
to their number”, a concern that raises the issue 
of recruitment and radicalization of ‘ordinary’ 
prisoners.52 Similarly, with respect to suspected 
terrorists, Alec Walen has argued that “they are 
predicted to pose a threat larger than that of almost 
all other criminals”.53 
Data about the extent of recidivism among 
those involved in terrorism acts in Indonesia, on 
the other hand, is unclear. Indeed, official data on 
recidivism with regard to acts of terrorism is not 
available yet. As highlighted in the introduction, 
Indonesian officials claim that many convicted 
terrorists repeated acts of terrorism, but the official 
number of recidivism cases for acts of terrorism 
has not been provided. Several studies (Jones;54 
Ungerer55) have underlined this lack of clarity, even 
though it has been revealed that recidivism rates for 
terrorism acts are notable in Indonesia. 
3. A Review on the Topic of Indonesia’s 
Dera dicalization Program for Terrorist 
Pri soners
a. Terrorist Prisoners and Its Treat-
ment  
Terrorist prisoners are not the same as 
other criminals.56 Rather, they are ‘special’ 
because this type of prisoner carries an 
ideology.57 A review conducted by Pressman 
and Flockton confirmed that there are 
significant differences between terrorists, 
violent extremists, and non-ideologically 
motivated violent offenders.58 
Pressman and Flockton pointed out that 
even though terrorists and violent extremists 
have similarities in using violence to further 
political, religious, and ideological aims, the 
acts of violent extremists commonly have 
no “intention to cause fear and terror in 
civilian populations or decision makers”.59 
The authors point to violent anti-abortionists 
as an example of a group that underlines 
their view. This group intend to cause 
enormous destructions to public facilities, 
such as property, buildings, vehicles, and 
hospitals, but “they have not demonstrated an 
interest in indiscriminate civilian killing, or 
maximum diffuse destruction”.60 In contrast, 
this psychological intention is a common 
objective of terrorist attacks.61 
As a consequence of these differences 
49 Peter R. Neumann, 2010, Prisons and Terrorism; Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries, International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, pp. 17-18.
50 Louise E. Porter and Mark R. Kebbel, “Radicalization in Australia: Examining Australia’s Convicted Terrorists”, Psychiatry Psychology and 
Law, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011, p. 212.
51 Jeffrey Monaghan, “Criminal Justice Policy Transfer and Prison Counter-radicalization: Examining Canadian Participation in the Roma-Lyon 
Group”, Canadian Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2015, p. 385. 
52 Andrew Silke (Ed), 2014, Prisons, Terrorism, and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform, Routledge, Oxon, 
p. 3.
53 Alec Walen, “A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists”, Maryland Law Review, Vol. 
70, No. 4, 2011, p. 872.
54 Clarke R. Jones, “Are Prisons Really Schools for Terrorism? Challenging the Rhetoric on Prison Radicalization”, Punishment and Society, 
Vol. 16, No. 1, 2014, p. 87.
55 Carl Ungerer, Op. cit., p. 17.
56 Liran Goldman, “From Criminals to Terrorists: the US Experience of Prison Radicalisation”, in Andrew Silke (Ed), 2014, Prisons, Terrorism, 
and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform, Routledge, Oxon, p. 48. 
57 Rohan Gunaratna, “Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative”, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Vol. 6, No. 1, 
2011, p. 67.
58 D. Elaine Pressman and John Flockton, “Violent Extremist Risk Assessment: Issues and Application of the VERA-2 in a High-Security 
Correctional Setting”, in Andrew Silke (Ed), 2014, Prisons, Terrorism, and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and 
Reform, Routledge, Oxon, pp. 123-125. 
59 Ibid., p. 124.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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between terrorists and other criminals, 
terrorist prisoners should be rehabilitated 
under a specific program. Although Mullin 
has observed that there are opportunities to 
adopt best practices from the rehabilitative 
literature on ordinary prisoners, he also noted 
that “the content of criminal and terrorist 
rehabilitation programs will always differ”.62
A specific de­radicalization program 
for terrorist prisoners has been implemented 
in several countries in order to achieve the 
goal of rehabilitation, and to stop the spread 
of radicalization in prisons. Saudi Arabia, for 
example, has a strategy called Prevention, 
Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC). In 
general, the program is recognized as a 
“soft” approach to terrorist prisoners within 
the concept of reform and transformation.63 
In another example, the United Kingdom 
has launched CONTEST (the government’s 
counter-terrorism strategy) and the revised 
PREVENT strategy.64 
On the one hand, de-radicalization 
pro grams in several countries display simi-
larities, or at least have the same approach 
or pattern. The countries which have 
implemented a similar pattern or approach to 
dealing with convicted terrorists are France, 
the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.65 These countries’ 
programs seem to focus on security, with 
only a limited awareness of promoting 
reform.66 On the other hand, these countries’ 
approaches can be found to differ. For 
instance, of the five countries named, only 
the Netherlands implemented ‘concentration’ 
principles, whereby all terrorist prisoners 
are held in one place at the high security 
prisons in Vaugh. However, the remaining 
four countries applied dispersal and (partial) 
concentration policies.67 
Alternatively, in the Philippines, a de-
radicalization program exists, but the policy 
is designed and implemented differently 
across the correctional system. For example, 
in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) convicted 
terrorists are integrated with ordinary inmates, 
whereas in the Metro Manila District Jail 
(MMDJ) they are separated from the general 
prison population.69 To sum up, in terms of 
de-radicalization programs worldwide, while 
every country has their own approach, each 
country’s program contains both similarities 
and/or significant differences with those of 
other countries.
b. The Nature of Indonesia’s Deradi-
calization Program for Terrorist 
Prisoners
Through the prisons and detention 
centers, Indonesia has also run a de-
radicalization program for terrorist prisoners. 
However, Indonesia’s program for convicted 
terrorists is not just following the global trend 
as implemented in other countries. Arguably, 
the foundation of Indonesia’s distinct 
program is underpinned by two principal 
factors: (1) that Indonesia has terrorist 
prisoners, and (2) that there is an indication 
of the spread of radicalization in Indonesian 
prisons. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, 
experts and studies conclude that Indonesia 
remains under the threat of terrorism even 
62 Sam Mullins, “Rehabilitation of Islamist Terrorists: Lesson from Criminology”, Dynamics of Asymetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism 
and genocide, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2010, p. 162.
63 Marisa Porges, “Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Approach to Terrorist Prisoners”, in Andrew Silke (Ed), 2014, Prisons, Terrorism, and Extremism: 
Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform, Routledge, Oxon, p. 169.
64 Richard Pickering, “Terrorism, Extremism, Radicalisation and the Offender Management System in England and Wales”, in Andrew Silke 
(Ed), 2014, Prisons, Terrorism, and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform, Routledge, Oxon, p. 161. 
65 Peter R. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 13.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., p. 18.
68 Clarke R. Jones and Resurrecion S. Morales, Op. cit., p. 219.
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though some of the most wanted terrorists 
have been killed or imprisoned. Therefore, 
the possibility of having terrorist prisoners 
will remain. 
Indonesia’s deradicalization program 
for terrorist prisoners has been implemented 
by either prison services or other governmental 
agencies such as the INP. According to 
Taufik Andrie,69 deradicalization program 
in Indonesian prisons could be identified 
by several activities, such as providing 
conflict management training (CMT) or 
inviting an ulama (Islamic scholar) from 
Indonesia Clerics Assembly (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia – MUI) to delivering a speech 
and discussion with terrorist prisoners. Yet, 
there are some prions that hold convicted 
terrorist have not specific deradicalization 
program as identified by Taufik Andrie.70 
The INP’s deradicalization program also 
focusses on ‘soft’ strategy by getting terrorist 
prisoners who were detained in Jakarta police 
headquarters and former terrorist prisoners 
who have renounced indiscriminate violence 
“to rethink armed struggle”.71 
Among these institutions, the program 
is coordinated by BNPT, which was 
established in 2010 based on President’s 
Regulation Number 46. Ironically, even 
though the program is coordinated by BNPT, 
some studies (Sarlito Wirawan;72 Milda 
Istiqomah73) stressed that the involvement 
of many agencies in the implementation of 
the program has drawbacks in achieving the 
goals of rehabilitation. To cope with these 
problems, Ungerer have recommended that 
the coordination between BNPT and prison 
services should be improved in their efforts 
to rehabilitate convicted terrorists.74
De-radicalization programs in Indo-
nesian prisons are currently developed and 
managed locally by prison directors consis-
tent with a prison’s circumstances and capa-
bility.75 Based on fieldwork conducted in 13 
prisons and detention centers in Indonesia, 
Taufik Andrie concluded that most of those 
prisons did not have a specific program for 
rehabilitating or de-radicalizing terrorist pris-
oners.76 Only two prisons were considered to 
have adequate programs: Porong (Surabaya) 
Prison and Semarang Prison.77
In line with the rehabilitation initia-
tives for terrorist convicts, the literature has 
shown that this can involve disengagement, 
de-radicalization, or both (Horgan and Brad-
dock;78 Mullins;79 Garry Hill80). De-radical-
ization is related to psychological change in 
terrorists’ ideology, while disengagement fo-
cuses on behavioral change. In addition, both 
of the programs can be implemented either 
at a group (collective) level or an individual 
level.81 
After an examination of Indonesia’s de-
radicalization program which is implemented 
either by INP or Indonesian prisons, some 
researchers (Sulatri Osman;82 Sarlito 
69 Taufik Andrie, Op. cit., pp. 11-14.
70 Ibid.
71 Sulastri Osman, Op. cit., p. 223.
72 Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono I, Op. cit., p. 136.
73 Milda Istiqomah, “De-radicalization Program in Indonesian Prisons: Reformation on the Correctional Institution”, US-China Law Review, 
Vol. 29, 2012, p. 268.
74 Carl Ungerer, Op. cit., p. 19.
75 Taufik Andrie, Op. cit., p. 10.
76  Ibid., pp. 10-14.
77 Ibid., p. 10.
78 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, Op. cit., p. 280.
79 Sam Mullins, Op. cit., p. 163.
80 Gary Hill, “Rehabilitating Terrorists”, Corrections Compendium, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2011, p. 32.
81 Peter R. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 12.
82 Sulastri Osman, Op. cit., p. 223.
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Wirawan;83 Horgan and Braddock;84 Abuza85) 
argue that Indonesia’s practices in managing 
terrorist prisoners reflect disengagement 
rather than de-radicalization. Meanwhile, 
Schmid states that Indonesia’s program is a 
combination of individual de-radicalization 
and collective de-radicalization.86 In a study 
on radicalization and de-radicalization in 
15 countries, Neumann identified Indonesia 
as a country that deploys individual de-
radicalization and disengagement programs 
along with Afghanistan, the Philippines, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Yemen.87 
Regardless of which programs are best suited 
to Indonesia’s approach, all agree that the 
noticeable features of Indonesia’s program 
are: (1) utilizing a former terrorist, Nasir bin 
Abbas, to re-educate terrorism prisoners; 
and (2) providing monetary incentives or 
economic assistance to captured terrorists, 
including their families.88
Discussion of the outcomes of Indone-
sia’s de-radicalization program reveals dis-
agreement about its efficacy. While research 
has shown that Indonesian prisons can be as-
sessed positively for their de-radicalization 
initiatives (Magnus Ranstorp, 2009),89 a new 
study conducted by Horgan and Braddock 
(2010) argues that such assessments of ini-
tiatives that focus on monetary incentives are 
“inaccurate and certainly premature to con-
sider this true de-radicalization”.90 Moreover, 
Hasan and Yasin’s investigation (2012) con-
cluded that the weakness in the prison system 
has allowed incarcerated terrorists to “conti-
nue their contribution to the extremist’s long 
term strategy”.91 It is indicated by incarcer-
ated extremists’ publications through various 
articles and books on pro-violence ideology. 
Despite such articles and books being small 
in number, “the potential of such publications 
to radicalize the broader community should 
not be underestimated”.92
With respect to how terrorist prisoners 
are housed, implementation depends on a 
prison’s capability and circumstances. It is 
a local initiative which is established by the 
prison director. As stated by Jones, it means 
that Indonesia has “no single strategy for 
managing terrorist offenders”.93 For example, 
in Cirebon prison, terrorist prisoners are 
prevented from interacting with other terrorist 
prisoners, whereas in Cibinong prison they 
are given the freedom to communicate with 
each other. Then again, in Cipinang prison, 
terrorist inmates are placed in a special block 
where there is also great opportunity to 
communicate.94 Theoretically, these methods 
could be classified as a mix of isolation and 
separation.95
83 Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono I, Op. cit., p. 133.
84 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, Op. cit., pp. 273-275.
85 Zachary Abuza, Op. cit., p. 198.
86 Alex P. Schmid, 2013, Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review, 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, p. 41.
87 Peter R. Neumann, Op. cit., pp. 47-58.
88 Theresa N. Eckard, 2014, Prison­based Deradicalization for Terrorist Detainees: An Analysis of Programmatic Religious Re­education and 
Systematic Institutionalization and their Impact on Achieving Deradicalization, Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, Illinois, p. 156.
89 Magnus Ranstorp, 2009, Preventing Violent Radicalization and Terrorism: The Case of Indonesia, Swedish National Defence College, 
Stockholm, p. 18. 
90 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, Op. cit., pp. 267 and 269. 
91 Muhammad Haniff Hasan and Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin, “Indonesian Prisons: A Think Tank for Terrorist”, Counter Terrorist Trends and 
Analysis, Vol. 4, Issue 8, 2012, p. 12.
92 Ibid., p. 11.
93 Clarke R. Jones, Loc. cit. 
94 Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan RI, “Ditjen PAS Gelar Rapat Koordinasi Persiapan Pembinaan dan Penempatan Napi Teroris”, http://
www.ditjenpas.go.id/ditjen­pas­gelar­rapat­koordinasi­persiapan­pembinaan­dan­penempatan­napi­teroris/, accessed on 21 September 
2014.
95 According to Neumann there are three models of distribution for this prisoner population: “namely whether they should all be held in one place 
(concentration); whether they should be separated from the general prison population (separation); and if they should be isolated from each 
other (isolation)”. See: Peter R. Neumann, Op. cit., p. 17.
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Currently, Indonesia has established 
a special prison for terrorist prisoners in 
Sentul, Bogor. This special prison is called 
Sentul prison.96 The Director General of 
Corrections, I Wayan Dusak,97 stated that this 
special prison will hold terrorist prisoners 
who are categorized as low-risk terrorist 
prisoners. On the one hand, establishing a 
special prison for terrorist prisoners in Sentul 
marks a new direction for the Indonesian 
government in dealing with the issue of 
rehabilitation for terrorist prisoners. On the 
other hand, a question that is why this special 
prison is needed for terrorist prisoners in 
Indonesia must be examined otherwise 
it could be ineffective in countering and 
preventing terrorism. 
c. A Research Gap and Future Re-
search Approach on the Topic of In-
donesia’s Deradicalization Program 
for Terrorist Prisoners 
A considerable amount of studies on 
the topic of deradicalization program for 
terrorist prisoners in the Indonesian context 
is available in the literature. Various identical 
studies have been identified. From my 
literature review, existing studies on such 
topic could be divided into two major groups: 
‘the program’ and ‘the terrorist prisoners’. 
This division is based on the ‘angle’ of 
discussion or from what aspects the program 
is viewed. From the program means that 
prison-based dearadicalization program is 
examined from the program itself, such as the 
implementation of the program or the program 
components analysis. Meanwhile, from the 
terrorist prisoner means that deradicalization 
program is examined from terrorist prisoners’ 
perspectives, such as investigation on how 
terrorist prisoners’ responses to the program 
or to what extent their involvement in the 
program. 
Firstly, studies on Indonesia’s prison-
based deradicalization program that are 
focused on the program itself have been 
conducted by scholars and experts on this 
field (Eckard;98 Johnston;99 Istiqomah;100 
Nurezki;101 ICG;102 Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, 
and Boucek103). Findings and discussions are 
widely available in the literature. Indonesia’s 
prison-based deradicalization program is 
selected either for comparative analysis or 
case study analysis. For example, Eckard104 
examines prison-based deradicalization 
program in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen 
dan Western Europe. Then the programs 
in those countries were compared to the 
U.S. programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Similar to Eckard, Johnston105 and Rabasa 
et al106 also select Indonesia’s prison-based 
dearadicalization program to be analyzed 
along with other countries. Slightly different 
with Eckard, those studies did not compare 
Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalization 
program with other selected countries. 
Johnston and Rabasa et al employ a 
96 Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan RI, “Januari 2017, Lapas Khusus Deradikallisasi Sentul Mulai Beroperasi”, http://www.ditjenpas.go.id/
januari-2017-lapas-khusus-deradikallisasi-sentul-mulai-beroprasi/, accessed on 8 Desember 2014.
97 Ibid.
98 Theresa N. Eckard, Op. cit., pp. 156-178
99 Amanda K. Johnston, 2009, Assesing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs on Islamist Extremists, Thesis, Naval Posgraduate 
School, California, pp.39-48. 
100 Milda Istiqomah, Op. cit. pp. 268-273.
101 Lendra Putra Nurezki, 2013, A Hazy Redemption: Can Radicalisation Work in Indonesia?, Thesis, National University of Singapore, 
Singapore, pp.77-86.
102 International Crisis Group, “Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons”, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south­east­asia/indonesia/
deradicalisation­and­indonesian­prisons, accessed on 21 September 2014.
103 Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Christopher Boucek, 2010, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, RAND, Santa Monica, 
pp. 106-116. 
104 Theresa N. Eckard, Op. cit., p. 7.
105 Amanda K. Johnston, Loc. cit.
106 Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Christopher Boucek, Loc. Cit. 
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separate single case study analysis to each 
national deradicalization program, including 
Indonesia’s program. 
In its report, ICG107 explores several 
practical aspects of Indonesia’s program, 
particularly on how terrorist prisoner are 
housed and what strategies have been applied 
by the Indonesian authorities in dealing with 
terrorist prisoners. Identical to ICG’s focus, 
both Nurezki108 and Istiqomah109 analyze 
Indoensia’s prison-based deradicalization 
program and its implementation. Although 
they are on the same focus, Nurezki and 
Istiqomah provide different recommendation 
for preventing recidivism on terrorism 
acts. Nurezki110 argues that the best 
strategy of deradicalization in Indonesia is 
disengagement while Istiqomah111 argues that 
a reformation on the correctional system is 
required.
Secondly, empirical qualitative 
studies on Indonesia’s prison-based 
deradicalization program that is viewed 
from convicted terrorist experiences and 
perspectives are also available (Sukabdi;112 
Ungerer;113 Andrie;114 Sarwono115). The focus 
in these studies is diverse. For example, 
Ungerer116 have examined terrorist prisoners’ 
involvement and experiences in prison-based 
deradicalization program, while Sarwono117 
have proposed a course of deradicalization 
program as a preliminary study for former 
terrorist prisoners. In a report, entitled 
‘Life Behind Bars: Terrorism and Prison 
Life in Indonesia’, Andrie argues that most 
of the participants refuse to involve in 
deradicalization program.118 He does not 
only examine terrorist prisoners’ response 
but also examine whether the prisons have 
run deradicalization program or not.119 In 
this sense, his study could also be included 
in the group that observed prison-based 
deradicalization program from the program.
A recent study, which is conducted by 
Sukabdi, shows a direct and specific discussion 
on the relationship between the program 
and terrorist prisoners. She selects terrorist 
prisoners and former terrorist prisoners as the 
object of research. In the findings, Sukabdi 
identifies five substantial matters: “terror 
activists’ behavior transformation process 
in Indonesia, critical areas of development 
needed in changing terrorism perpetrators’ 
behaviors, key elements in rehabilitation, 
criterion for successful rehabilitation, and 
parameters of effective deradicalization”.120 
Additionally, this study reveals a positive 
result that there is possibility of behavior 
transformation from pro-violence to non-
violence. In order to rehabilitate Indonesian 
terrorist prisoners, Sukabdi argues that 
there are six dimensions of critical areas of 
development needed, namely: social skills, 
personal skills, vocational skills, spiritual 
107 International Crisis Group, “Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons”, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south­east­asia/indonesia/
deradicalisation­and­indonesian­prisons, accessed on 21 September 2014.
108 Lendra Putra Nurezki, Loc. Cit.
109 Milda Istiqomah, Loc. Cit.
110 Lendra Putra Nurezki, Op. cit., 137-138.
111 Milda Istiqomah, Op. cit., p. 273.
112 Zora A. Sukabdi, “Terrorism in Indonesia: A Review on Rehabilitation and Deradicalization”, Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 
2015, pp. 36-56.
113 Carl Ungerer, Op. cit., pp. 11-19.
114 Taufik Andrie, Op. cit., p. 14-24. 
115 Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono I, Op. cit., pp. 44-59. See also: Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono (Hereinafter referred to as Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono II), 
2013, Menakar Jiwa Mantan Teroris Melalui Tes Davido CHaD, Salemba Humanika, Jakarta, pp. 43-56.
116 Carl Ungerer, Op. cit., pp. 14-17.
117 Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono II, Op. cit., p. 44.
118 Taufik Andrie., Op. cit. 17-18.
119 Ibid., pp. 11-14.
120 Zora A. Sukabdi, Op. cit., p 52.
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maturity, domestic skills, and contextual 
insight.121 
To sum up, after reviewing the literature 
on the topic of Indonesia’s deradicalization 
program for terrorist prisoners, a research gap 
could be identified that is a lack of studies 
focused on Indonesian prison officers as the 
implementer of the program. Even though 
numerous studies have been devoted to ‘the 
program’ and ‘the terrorist prisoners’ but less 
attention has been paid to ‘the prison officers’. 
Consequently, conducting a research that 
is focused on the prison officers’ point of 
view is worthwhile to extend the body of 
literature on this topic. Besides extending 
the body of literature, it is beneficial to 
develop an integrated understanding on the 
complexity of the implementation of the 
program. In addition, an examination of this 
end of deardicalization program may prove 
invaluable for future policy and practice. 
In connection to the grouping of the 
existing studies on the topic of Indonesia’s 
deradicalization program for terrorist 
prisoners, this new approach would extend 
the group from two into three major groups: 
(1) the program; (2) the terrorist prisoners; 
and (3) the prison officers. Furthermore, 
within the context of prison officers’ point 
of view, the focus of the research could be 
narrowed into a specific issue. There are many 
issues related to prison officers’ role in the 
implementation of deradicalization program. 
To select a specific one it could be started by 
investigating a current phenomenon and/or 
by investigating relevant literature indeed. 
C. Conclusion 
The number of terrorist prisoners in 
Indonesian prisons is significantly lower than other 
types of prisoner. The number, however, cannot be 
disregarded. Indonesian prisons have to cope with at 
least two critical issues. The first is how to prevent 
the spread of radicalization in prisons, as evidenced 
by terrorist inmates’ successful radicalization of 
ordinary inmates such as Yuli Harsono, Hamzah, and 
Gema Awal Ramadhan122. To make matters worse, 
prison guards are also targets for radicalization, as 
in the case of Beni Irawan123. The second issue is 
how to change inmates’ radical beliefs during their 
imprisonment. The seriousness of this problem 
is highlighted by the 18 known recidivism cases 
between 2009 and 2010124. In other words, terrorist 
inmates retain their radical beliefs and engage in 
terrorist activities after release. To deal with this 
issue, a de-radicalization program for terrorist 
prisoners has been instituted by the Indonesian 
government. In this article, the literature on 
Indonesia’s de-radicalization program for terrorist 
prisoners has been reviewed. The main goals of this 
review are to understand the nature of the program, 
identify the research gap, and to indicate approaches 
for future research. Following the review, a number 
of conclusions can be drawn. First, even though 
many governmental agencies get involved in the de-
radicalization program (e.g., Directorate General of 
Corrections; INP), the program is coordinated by 
BNPT. The involvement of many agencies in the 
implementation of the program has some limitations 
in achieving the goal of rehabilitation, such as a 
“lack of coordination and over-division”.125 Second, 
there is no agreement among experts as to whether 
Indonesia’s program reflects disengagement or de­
radicalization. Nevertheless, there is agreement 
that the noticeable features of Indonesia’s program 
are: (1) the utilizing of a former terrorist, Nasir bin 
Abbas, to re-educate terrorist prisoners; and (2) 
the provision of monetary incentives or economic 
121 Ibid., p. 46.
122 Agus Surya Bakti, 2014, Darurat Terorisme: Kebijakan Pencegahan, Perlindungan, dan Deradikalisasi, Daulat Press, Jakarta, p. 193.
123 International Crisis Group (ICG), 2012, “Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons”, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south­east­asia/
indonesia/deradicalisation­and­indonesian­prisons, accessed on 21 September 2014.
124 Taufik Andrie, Op. cit., p. 10. 
125 Milda Istiqomah, Loc. cit.
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assistance to captured terrorists, including their 
families. 
Third, the program is currently developed 
and managed locally by prison directors consistent 
with a prison’s circumstances and capability. 
Consequently, each prison’s capability not only 
impacts its ability to implement the de-radicalization 
program, but also how terrorist prisoners are housed. 
This indicates that Indonesia has no national strategy 
concerning how terrorist prisoners are housed 
in each prison. Even though a special prison for 
terrorist prisoners has been established, policy on 
how this type of prisoner is housed in other prisons 
remains on the prison director initiative. Fourth, 
discussion of the outcomes of the de-radicalization 
program in Indonesian prisons reveals disagreement 
about its efficacy. While one study provides a 
positive assessment of Indonesia’s de-radicalization 
program, others argue that Indonesia’s initiative 
has been unsuccessful. Moreover, Indonesia has no 
measurement criteria for indicating the effectiveness 
of the program. 
Fifth, although a considerable amount of 
studies on the topic of deradicalization program 
for terrorist prisoners in the Indonesian context 
is available in the literature, less attention has 
been paid to Indonesian prison officers who are 
implementing the program at the coalface. After 
reviewing the literature, existing studies on this 
topic could be divided into two major groups: the 
program and the terrorist prisoners. There is a lack 
of study focused on the implementer of the program. 
Therefore, a research that is focused on Indonesian 
prison officers’ point of view pertaining to the 
implementation of prison-based deradicalization 
program program is critical. Besides extending 
the body of literature, this new approach would 
develop an integrated understanding on the program 
implementation; and it may prove invaluable for 
future policy and practice.
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